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Sudan: Capabilities and Loyalties of the Military

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An Intelligence Assessment

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NESA 82-10627
December 1982

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Sudan: Capabilities and Loyalties of the Military

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper has been prepared by Office of Near East–South Asia Analysis, with the appendixes prepared by Office of Central Reference. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,

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This paper has been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and the National Intelligence Council.

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Sudan: Capabilities and Loyalties of the Military

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Key Judgments

Information available as of 1 December 1982 was used in this report.

The cohesiveness of the Sudanese military is weakened by a number of internal factors, but it remains the best organized institution in a country where ethnic, tribal, geographic, and sectarian divisions threaten national unity. Sudanese military capabilities, moreover, are seriously hampered by obsolete equipment, logistic and maintenance deficiencies, and basic weaknesses in training, leadership, and organization. Little real improvement is likely in the next few years.

Sudanese military forces can contain current levels of Libyan and Ethiopian-backed insurgent activity, but they would be severely taxed if the number of dissidents and their attacks escalated dramatically. More importantly, an escalation of subversive activities by southern dissidents would exacerbate already tense north-south relations and might encourage mutinies by southern troops.

Although there is growing criticism of President Gaafar Nimeiri within the armed forces, he appears to retain the support of most of the Sudanese military. He faces a formidable array of domestic problems, however, and the overthrow of his regime cannot be ruled out, particularly if deteriorating economic conditions spark extensive civil unrest. In the event of massive civilian disturbances over economic grievances, senior Army officers might refuse to intervene, leading to Nimeiri's fall. If growing economic and social grievances produce anti-Nimeiri conspiracies within the junior officer corps, a preemptive coup might be launched by more senior officers.

Any military government that replaced Nimeiri would be less likely to maintain Sudan's present close working relationship with the United States, although we would not expect a complete turnaround by the Sudanese. Even a military government run by senior or older middle-grade officers—thought to be generally pro–United States and pro-Egyptian—would need to project an image of independence from foreign influence in order to consolidate its political position. Sudan's support for US positions on regional issues—including the peace process with Israel—might wane, and Nimeiri's offer of military facilities to the United States might be withdrawn, if only temporarily. Outward displays of cooperation with Egypt would probably be cut back for a time. Nonetheless, a new government probably would still need US economic and military aid and would continue to look to Egypt for assistance against Libyan and Ethiopian threats.

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Figure 1

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Sudan: Capabilities and Loyalties of the Military [1]

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Sudan in recent years has become more strategically significant to the United States and other Western countries as a result of growing Soviet and Cuban influence in the Horn of Africa and Libyan leader Qadhafi's meddling in the region. In addition, Sudan is of considerable strategic interest to Egypt, and the two countries recently signed an integration charter to enhance economic, political, and military ties. President Gaafar Nimeiri's willingness to support moderate positions in regional and international forums has added to Sudan's importance to the United States. For example, Sudan backed the Camp David accords in 1978 and has strongly endorsed President Reagan's Middle East peace initiative of September 1982.

Table 1
Sudanese Armed Forces
Personnel Strength

Estimated mid-1982

	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Total	**3,740**	**55,650**	**59,390**
Army	3,000	48,000	51,000
Air Force	280	2,750	3,030
Air Defense	300	2,900	3,200
Navy	160	2,000	2,160

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Nimeiri followed Egyptian President Sadat's lead by breaking with Moscow in 1976. In the same year he also signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt. Thereafter, he sought economic aid from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states while looking to the West for military assistance. In recent years Nimeiri has increasingly aligned Sudan with Washington and Cairo, in part because of security concerns caused by Soviet-supported regimes in neighboring Libya and Ethiopia. The Sudanese also participated in joint military exercises with Egypt and the United States in 1981 and 1982.

Nimeiri's offer to allow US access to Sudanese military facilities and to pre-position US military equipment in Sudan has made the country an important element in US plans to establish a military capability in the region. Access to such military facilities would provide increased flexibility to the United States in responding to crises in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The continued political stability of Sudan, therefore, is an important US objective.

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Status of Forces

The Sudanese armed forces remain the key to the country's stability. They currently number some 59,000 men [2]—compared to fewer than 10,000 in 1956 when formal independence was attained from Great Britain and Egypt (see table 1). Most of this expansion took place between 1966 and 1972 when the government accelerated efforts to suppress the insurgency in the south. When the civil war ended in 1972, many of the former southern rebels were integrated into the armed forces.

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The structure and organization of the Sudanese armed forces reflect both British and Soviet influence. For example, the training system follows a modified British pattern, but the existence of air defense as a separate service is a Soviet innovation. The Sudanese military command structure resembles that of the

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[2] In addition to the four armed services—Army, Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy—Sudan has a national police force of about 27,000 men. The national police and the Army share responsibility for internal security.

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Figure 2
Sudanese People's Armed Forces High Command



[a] President Nimeiri presently is acting Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Chief of Staff.

[b] Both posts are normally held by a single officer.

[c] The current Deputy Minister of Defense, General Suwar Dahab, is also the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

[d] Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations is the most powerful and prestigious position of the three.

[e] Director of Military Intelligence often reports directly to the President.

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Egyptian armed forces in that there is no Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army usually staffs the higher command positions (see figure 2). A general acceptance of the Army's traditional dominance as the senior service and its overwhelming size have kept interservice rivalries to a minimum. Key posts held by the Army include the Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff—both posts currently held by Nimeiri—Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and Director of Military Intelligence. The Army also dominates in resource allocation, normally followed by the Air Force, Air Defense, and lastly the Navy.

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There is a longstanding warrior tradition among many Sudanese ethnic groups, and the performance of Sudanese soldiers during World War II was commended by most Western observers. Since independence, the armed forces have gained combat experience in counterinsurgency operations during the civil war in the south (1955-72). Small contingents also were sent to Congo (1960-61), to Kuwait with an Arab League Force (1961-63), and to Egypt during the Arab-Israeli wars (1967-74).

Army. The Sudanese Army is responsible for internal security and protection of the country's borders. The Army has an infantry division deployed in each of the country's four regional military commands and one armored division in Khartoum (see figure 3), according to US defense attache reporting. Other combat and support units include an airborne brigade, a republican and a presidential guard in Khartoum, and a border guard contingent. Most combat units are under the operational control of the four regional divisions, although the different branches of the Army have separate and apparently distinct administrative and logistic systems. Most Army equipment is old, much of it Soviet in origin, and spare parts are increasingly difficult to acquire (see table 2).

Sporadic attacks by Sudanese insurgents based in Ethiopia in mid-1982 caused Khartoum to deploy some units and equipment to the Ethiopian border area. elements of both the Eastern and Southern Military Regions near the border are severely under strength, and morale is low because of poor equipment. Confusion over operational responsibility for large segments of territory between the 1st and 2nd Divisions reportedly has created defensive gaps on the eastern border. Sudanese military authorities are aware of these deficiencies, and they are attempting to correct them.

Air Force. The Air Force is responsible for the defense of territorial airspace, logistic and reconnaissance support to regional commands, and close air support to ground units in the event of hostilities. It has an inventory of 89 aircraft of Soviet, Chinese, and Western origin (see table 3), and some 100 active-duty pilots. There are seven Air Force flying units (three fighter squadrons, one fighter-training unit, one transport squadron, and two helicopter squadrons) deployed at the country's two major airfields near Khartoum—Wadi Seidna Military Airbase and Khartoum International Airport (see figure 4).[3] 25X1

Air Defense. The Air Defense Command is a separate service headquartered near Port Sudan. Air defense is divided into two major sectors: the central sector including Khartoum, and the eastern sector including Port Sudan. Outside of these two areas, protection of important targets is handled by local infantry commanders. 25X1 25X1

The SA-2 brigade is based near Port Sudan. Two other air defense artillery brigades are deployed near Khartoum and in eastern Sudan for the protection of airfields, government buildings, and hydroelectric facilities (see figure 3). In response to the Libyan intervention in Chad, a battalion-sized air defense unit was assigned to the Western Regional Command in 1980. Virtually all major air defense equipment is of Soviet origin, and most is nonoperational because of age and lack of spare parts (see table 4). 25X1 25X1

Navy. The Navy is organized into six squadrons—four with patrol responsibilities, one a landing craft squadron, and one an auxiliary and service squadron. Naval headquarters is located in Port Sudan at the Flamingo Bay Naval Base. Four coastal observation stations are manned by two shore battalions. The Navy has no marine corps or air component. 25X1 25X1

All naval craft have been acquired from Yugoslavia and prerevolutionary Iran with the exception of one Sudanese-built launch (see table 5). The country has only one operational patrol boat out of an inventory of 19 assorted craft. The Navy cannot currently patrol its coastline, prevent smuggling, or even guard territorial waters. 25X1 25X1 25X1

[3] In the past, military aircraft occasionally have been deployed to other airports in the following pattern: MIG-17/21s to Kassala, Provosts to El Fasher and Malakal, MI-8 helicopters to El Fasher, and BO-105 helicopters to Port Sudan. 25X1

Figure 3
Major Army and Air Defense Commands and Combat Ground Units



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Table 2
Sudanese Army Weapons and Equipment

Estimated inventory as of mid-1982

Tanks		
Medium		
T-54, T-55	USSR	100
M-47	United States, Saudi Arabia	50
M-60A3	United States	20
Light		
Type 62	China	70
M-41	United States, Saudi Arabia	15
Armored vehicles		
Armored personnel carriers		
BTR-50	USSR	20
OT-62	Czechoslovakia	20
OT-64B	Czechoslovakia	10
BTR-152	USSR	20
M3	France	8
M-113A2	United States	36
al-Walid	Egypt	20
Armored reconnaissance vehicles		
BRDM-2	USSR	30
Commando	United States	40
Saladin	United Kingdom	15
Ferret	United Kingdom	50
Panhard AML 245	France	6
Artillery		
76-mm field gun, ZIS-3	USSR	18
85-mm AT gun, D-44	USSR	12
25-pdr gun howitzer	United Kingdom	12
100-mm field gun, M1955	USSR	12
105-mm pack howitzer	Italy	6
105-mm howitzer	Germany	18
122-mm howitzer, M-30	USSR	24
122-mm field gun, D-74	USSR	4
152-mm gun howitzer, D-20	USSR	4
155-mm howitzer, M114A1	United States	12
Antitank weapons and rocket launchers		
75-mm, Type 56	China	15
106-mm, M40	United States	75
Swingfire	United Kingdom	4
BM-21	Egypt	4
Mortars		
81-mm and above	USSR, France, United States, China	167

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Figure 4
Air Force Units and Major Airfields



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Table 3
Sudanese Air Force Inventory

Estimated mid-1982

Total	**89**
Fighters	
MIG-21 Fishbed	8
Chinese F-6 MIG-19	10
MIG-17 Fresco	9
Chinese F-5 MIG-17	7
Trainers	
MIG-21 Mongol	2
Chinese F-6 MIG-19	2
MIG-15 Midget	2
Jet Provost T-55	4
F-5F [a]	2
Transports [b]	
Medium range: C-130 Hercules	6
Short range: DHC-5 Buffalo	4
VIP jet	1
Helicopters	
MI-8 Hip [c]	14
MBB BO-105	10
PumA	2
AB-212 [d]	6

[a] The F-5F trainers have recently arrived in Sudan but as of late November 1982 had not yet been flown or placed in a flying unit,

DIA 25X1 four C-130s and three DHC-5 Buffalos were out of commission in late November 1982.

DIA 25X1 [c] All MI-8 HIP helicopters were out of commission in late November 1982,

[d] The Italian AB-212s, a gift from Abu Dhabi, are being assembled and should soon enter the inventory

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Table 4
Sudan's Air Defense Units and Equipment

	Inventory
Three surface-to-air missile battalions (SA-2)	18 launchers (68 missiles)
Two Air defense artillery battalions (100-mm guns)	24
Two air defense artillery battalions (40-mm guns)	36
Three air defense artillery battalions	
37-mm guns, twin and single	73
12.7-mm HMG	Unknown
Three platoons (SA-7) [b]	Unknown
Five radar companies (Soviet radar) [c]	30

[a] All SA-2s are located near Port Sudan.

DIA 25X1 hey are all inoperable because of missile propellant problems.

[b] Serviceability of SA-7 missiles is unknown; some are reportedly in the Khartoum area.

[c] All these radars are reportedly inoperable.

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Manpower

A conscription law was adopted in 1971 but never implemented, and all four services continue to be composed largely of volunteers.[4] They serve a minimum of three years, and reenlistment is limited to six three-year tours. Since the armed forces, especially the Air Force, has had difficulty retaining trained specialists and technicians because of higher civilian salaries available in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, skilled personnel must serve a minimum of nine years.

25X1 additional manning problems are generated by selective military recruitment practices that limit the induction of larger numbers of westerners and southerners because of security concerns.

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Despite reports of planning for a national reserve program, none exists, and we know of no national mobilization plan. In the event of a national emergency, former military men and civilian assets could be recruited, but insufficient military equipment and a poor logistics system would hinder their effectiveness.

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US military observers agree that the professional standards of the Sudanese armed forces compare favorably with most other African countries. Although not the best educated or prestigious profession

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[4] Recent Embassy reporting quoted First Vice President Tayyib as stating that a new conscription law would soon be passed. He indicated that service of about one year has been considered for men between 18 and 30. The purpose of the new conscription law is to train young men for civic action and not to increase the size of the Army.

Table 5
Sudanese Naval Craft Inventory

Estimated mid-1982

Total	19 [a]
Patrol craft	2
Coastal patrol boats	7
Harbor patrol boats	4
Utility landing craft	2
Auxiliary and service craft	4

[a] All naval craft are nonoperational with the exception of one coastal patrol boat according to the latest available information from the defense attache.

in Sudan, the military tends to be the only group that instills a sense of national unity and accountability to the nation. The British colonial legacy of discipline still lingers in Sudan's military training and education.

The Army's education and training system is better than in most African countries. There are basic training facilities, an officer candidate college, a command and staff school, and various branch and occupational schools for commissioned and noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. Egypt, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China currently provide the bulk of in-country training assistance. Advanced technical training for enlisted men and higher staff training for officers are provided by Egypt and at least 20 other countries, including the United States. Significant numbers of commissioned and noncommissioned officers have been sent to staff, branch, and technical schools abroad.

Volunteers for the Army, Air Defense, and Navy must undergo six months of basic infantry training. Thereafter, naval and air defense personnel spend at least one year being trained in their various specialties at branch schools. Unlike the other three services, Air Force pilots and maintenance technicians must attend basic training schools abroad. A national flight training school has been under discussion in recent years, but lack of funding has prevented its formation.

Budgetary constraints have severely limited practical training experience in all the services. There are serious shortages of training aids, ammunition, equipment, and fuel. According to US defense attache reporting, fuel shortages have limited flying time for pilots, causing a serious erosion in flying proficiency. The Air Force's MIG-21s are reportedly flown only three times a week to conserve fuel. DIA 25X1 DIA 25X1 the most experienced naval officers and men are seconded to the United Arab Emirates Navy in order to keep skills current on modern equipment. Air defense personnel are considered ineffective because of limited use of live-fire training. 25X1

US military observers note that the Sudanese make tough, well-disciplined individual soldiers for counter-insurgency or small unit ground operations. They point out, however, that Sudanese fighting capabilities erode considerably when more sophisticated equipment and larger units are involved. 25X1

Domestic and Foreign Economic Support

Sudan has few domestic resources to support the modernization of its military forces. All armaments and spare parts must be imported since Sudanese industries are capable of producing only small quantities of ammunition and assorted quartermaster materiel. Additionally, Sudan's labor force has a very limited managerial and technical base from which the military can draw. Given the need to deal with the country's serious economic difficulties—inadequate transportation and communication, stagnant real growth, and a massive foreign debt burden it cannot service—there are few prospects for Sudan increasing domestic production of military materiel in the foreseeable future. 25X1 25X1

While government finances are severely restricted, 10 to 12 percent of the central government budget is allocated to defense operating expenditures. If capital expenditures financed by foreign loans were added to this figure, it would be well over 20 percent (see table 6). Although the share of the budget going to defense

Table 6
Sudan: Operating Defense Expenditures [a]

	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82 [b]
Defense expenditures					
Million US $	228.5	213.2	272.1	279.8	220.8
Million Sudanese pounds	82.6	85	125.0	144.6	155
Percentage of GDP	2.9	2.6	3.1	3.3	NA
Percentage of central government budget	10.6	10.6	12.9	10.7	12.2

capital expenditures for defense, financed almost entirely by foreign loans, are not included in the budget: such expenditures were estimated o reach $200 million in 1981/82.

[b] The Sudanese fiscal year begins on 1 July.

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is not out of proportion to spending by other LDCs, it is a heavy burden for the government to carry, given Sudan's extremely poor financial situation.

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Since the termination of Soviet military aid in the mid-1970s, Sudan has depended on the West and moderate Arab states for assistance. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have provided cash grants for equipment. Egypt has given extensive grant training and some equipment. Other non-US donors that have provided equipment and training either through credit or grant aid are Britain, France, West Germany, Yugoslavia, and China. Total military assistance from non-US sources amounted to some $200 million in 1980-81.

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The United States resumed military assistance to Sudan in late 1977 with the sale of six C-130 transport aircraft, and since then the US program has steadily expanded. At the request of President Nimeiri, moreover, US military survey teams have examined selected organizational and equipment problems of the Sudanese armed forces. To date, Sudan has received more than $150 million in US military aid including credits, grants, and training programs (see table 7).

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Force Modernization

The Army's modernization plans have included the acquisition of additional arms and equipment to improve armor, firepower, mobility, communications, and engineering capabilities. The purpose of the modernization program has been to develop a light, mobile force capable of defending borders and containing insurgency. According to Defense Department publications and reports from the US defense attache and Embassy in Khartoum, equipment delivered or ordered in recent years includes the following:

- The United States has provided 36 M-113A2 armored personnel carriers, 20 M-60A3 tanks, six M-125A2 81-mm armored mortar carriers, and 12 155-mm howitzers. Plans exist for future acquisition of US trucks, armored fighting vehicles, and additional armored personnel carriers, artillery, and howitzers.

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- Since 1976 the Saudis have provided some $420 million for more than 2,400 German trucks and spare parts. In 1981 Saudi Arabia also transferred to Sudan 50 US-built M-47 and 15 M-41 tanks (with spare parts for two years), machineguns, ammunition, and uniforms.

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Table 7
Sudan: US Military and Economic Aid Commitments [a]

Million US $

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Total military assistance	**0.2**	**5.3**	**25.4**	**32.3**	**101.2**
Loans		5.0	25.0	30.0	50.0
Credit financing		5.0	25.0	30.0	50.0
Grants	0.2	0.3	0.4	2.3	51.2
MAP grants				1.7	
Credit converted to grants					50.0
International military education and training	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.2
Total economic assistance [b] **(grants)**	**20.3**	**37.9**	**99.6**	**109.4**	**154.0**

[a] US fiscal years.
[b] All kinds of economic assistance, including PL-480.

- West Germany has contributed through grant aid to the construction of a basic training facility and provided military support equipment.

- Egypt sold 20 "al-Walid" wheeled armored personnel carriers in 1981, and 80 more are on order. Grant aid from Egypt has included a small number of T-54 and T-55 tanks, BM-21 rocket launchers, Swingfire antitank missiles, and 122-mm multiple rocket launchers.

- China has provided grants, credits, and commercial sales since 1972. Military equipment on order or partially delivered include 31 Type 62 light tanks, 30 Type 59 tanks, 18 130-mm field guns, 360 trucks, field artillery, and support equipment.

- In 1980 France financed a $33 million sale of 38 AMX armored vehicles. Deliveries are continuing.

- Deliveries are continuing under a commercial sale from the United Kingdom of 100 Landrovers, armored reconnaissance vehicles, and spare parts. Britain has also provided grant training assistance worth well over $150 million.

Air Force modernization efforts have concentrated on refurbishing older aircraft and the acquisition of newer ones. Since 1979 the Yugoslavs have overhauled most of Sudan's MIG-21 fighters, which will extend their operational life to about 1985.

he Sudanese are interested in replacing or supplementing their MIG-21s with US F-5s by 1985, but hoped-for Saudi funding has not yet been forthcoming. Khartoum has recently acquired two F-5F trainers with the option of 10 more when funds become available.

the Chinese F-5 fighters delivered in the last few years have had persistent maintenance problems, but the 12 F-6 fighter-trainer aircraft acquired from China in 1981-82 have improved the country's ground attack capability.

plans to acquire British BAC-167 Strikemasters have been delayed because of Sudan's inability to obtain a funding guarantee from Saudi Arabia.

In recent years the Air Force has obtained six C-130 medium-range transports from the United States and four DHC-5 Buffalo short-range transports from Canada. Although these have significantly improved transport capabilities, the Air Force's ability to provide logistic support to ground units throughout the country remains limited. We know of no plans to acquire additional transport aircraft in the near future.

Since the late 1970s the Air Force has acquired two Puma transport helicopters as a gift from France, 10 German BO-105 utility helicopters funded by the Saudis and Kuwaitis, and six Italian Augusta Bell 212s recently received as a gift from Abu Dhabi.

the Sudanese are interested in acquiring more helicopters since they are critical for transporting troops quickly during counterinsurgency operations.

Khartoum hopes to replace its Soviet MI-8 transport helicopters in the next few years.

the Sudanese are trying to negotiate a barter deal for 12 French-licensed Puma

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helicopters from Romania. If these plans fail, the Air Force hopes to acquire US Bell UH-1H transport helicopters after 1984.

The Air Force cannot perform its mission to defend territorial airspace because it lacks an adequate system of early warning, command and control, fire control, and firepower. If Sudanese plans to acquire the US TPS-43 radar materialize, the Air Force's air defense capability would improve considerably. According to reports from the US Embassy in Khartoum, modest efforts are under way to upgrade the Wadi Seidna Military Airbase to prepare for US F-5s. US military observers also have noted Sudan's need to improve other existing airfields for use as forward fighter airbases, especially those along the eastern border with Ethiopia and toward the country's border with Chad and Libya.

The Sudanese also would like to replace most of their Soviet air defense equipment since much of it is nonoperational, according to US military observers. Sudan has virtually no capability to detect an air attack or defend against one. US Vulcan 20-mm guns are on order and will be delivered in 1984. These should help improve air defense capability since a significant number of strategic sites are being defended by old Soviet antiaircraft artillery whose reliability is questionable. Further improvements in air defense will depend on available funding.

The naval budget has had the lowest priority in Sudan's defense allocations, and the Navy has been neglected for a number of years. Some $30 million of US foreign military sales credit for 1981-82, however, have been set aside for naval modernization. Most of these funds will be used to build and repair dockside support facilities at Flamingo Bay. Sudan has also agreed with US Navy survey team recommendations to refurbish their small patrol craft and to purchase additional ones if funding remains available.

Logistics and Maintenance

The root causes of logistic and maintenance problems include shortages of foreign exchange to purchase spare parts, ammunition, and fuel; extreme weapons diversification since the late 1960s; an insufficient transportation and communication network; and an inefficient supply system. Just as serious, however, is the lack of personnel with managerial and technical skills. Despite the extensive overseas training given commissioned and noncommissioned officers in recent years, US military observers believe there has been little improvement in the lax Sudanese attitude toward the maintenance of sophisticated equipment.

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The armed forces have particular difficulty in maintaining a dependable and affordable source of spare parts for aging Soviet equipment. This problem is largely responsible for the fact that Sudan's Soviet tanks were less than 30 percent operational in 1981, according to US military officials.

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the Air Force can no longer acquire MIG-21 batteries from Yugoslavia because the Soviets have blocked their transfer. A set of MIG-21 batteries from the Soviet Union is about $6,000, while a similar set from Egypt costs around $11,000. The US defense attache reports that spare parts shortages are responsible for the nonoperational status of all air defense radars, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, and most artillery.

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Although existing armed forces maintenance and repair shops are generally well-organized, US military officials have noted a shortage in the number of facilities and the amount of available maintenance equipment. For example, while the SA-2 surface-to-air maintenance and repair facility near Port Sudan is considered good by US military observers, air defense artillery units in the Khartoum area have only minor repair capabilities. Maintenance of artillery outside the Khartoum area, moreover, depends on the availability of local technicians, and equipment normally is sent to the capital for repair. The naval shops and repair facilities at Flamingo Bay are not functioning, and harbor facilities are grossly inadequate, according to US military officials. With help provided by the US military aid program, these facilities should improve considerably over the next few years.

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shortages of personnel with technical and management skills are adding to maintenance and logistics problems. The Army, for

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example, remains heavily dependent on foreign technicians to maintain even its overall equipment operational rate of less than 50 percent. The fairly high operational rates for aircraft reported by the US defense attache in 1981—51 percent for fighters and transports and 42 percent for helicopters—were largely due to the presence of foreign advisers.

these operational rates have fallen significantly during 1982 as spare parts shortages have taken their toll.

There is, moreover, no unified logistic management structure to coordinate support for the multinational equipment in Sudan's weapons inventory. In the case of the Army, each branch is responsible for the logistic support of all equipment in its possession. The duplication inherent in such a system creates gross inefficiencies. US technical assistance teams assigned to Sudan see the overall restructuring of the logistic management system as a major goal for improving combat readiness.

Capabilities Outlook

Little improvement in Sudanese military capabilities is likely over the next few years without the acquisition of significant amounts of newer equipment and spare parts for existing older equipment. Even if this occurs, however, improvements will be slow because of the time the military will require to absorb operational and maintenance procedures for newer equipment.

The continuing weakness of Sudan's military capabilities means that the country will remain vulnerable to militarily superior neighbors (see table 8). Fortunately for Sudan, the threat of a conventional ground attack from either Libya or Ethiopia probably will remain slight. Neither country could sustain an offensive for any length of time because of the inhospitable terrain, long distances, and difficulties in sustaining lines of communications. Additionally, neither country wishes to risk activating the Egyptian-Sudanese mutual defense pact signed in 1976 and be forced to engage Egyptian military forces.

Although the threat of a massive ground attack appears remote, Sudan is vulnerable to air attack from Libya and Ethiopia. Military and commercial targets in eastern Sudan are well within range of Ethiopian military aircraft, and some Libyan aircraft could reach the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Sudanese air defense capabilities are negligible and could neither effectively detect nor defend against an air attack.

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Sudanese military forces can contain Libyan- and Ethiopian-backed insurgent activity by Sudanese dissidents as long as it continues at present levels. If the Sudanese are able to complete existing ground and air modernization plans, their military forces should improve considerably current proficiency in counterinsurgency and small unit operations. A dramatic growth in insurgent activity, however, would severely tax the military's manpower and limited equipment and logistic resources. The escalation of southern dissident activity also would create new north-south tensions particularly within the military's 1st Division (Southern Command).

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Political and Social Factors

The Sudanese military is beset by a variety of internal problems but is the best organized institution in a country where ethnic, tribal, geographic, and sectarian divisions threaten national unity. According to Sudanese scholars, this sense of group identity stems from a proud fighting tradition and is further enhanced by a sense of distinction from the civilian sector that is blamed for most of the country's problems. A frequently cited example of the military's unity was its willingness to support the Nimeiri regime against an Ansar Muslim rebellion in 1970 even though a large percentage of military personnel are of Ansar heritage.

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The key political roles played by the Sudanese armed forces—political power base for the regime, guarantor of political order, and symbol of national unity—are an integral part of the military's corporate identity. Nimeiri has ratified the armed forces' political role both in the constitution of 1973 and in public pronouncements that the military is the protector of the 1969 revolution and an active participant in Sudan's national development. Despite extensive efforts by

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Table 8
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Libya:
Force Levels and Equipment Inventories

Estimated personnel strengths and major equipment for mid-1982

	Sudan	Ethiopia	Libya
Army			
Personnel	54,000 [a]	240,000 [c]	60,000 [a]
Tanks	255	525-625 [d]	2,500
Artillery (over 100-mm)	143	500-600 [d]	950
Mortars (over 100-mm)	165	1,100-1,300	435
Air defense guns	133	500-550 [d]	Unknown
Armored vehicles	275	500-600 [d]	2,335
SAM battalions	3	8	65
Navy			
Personnel	2,000	3,500	6,000
Missile attack boats	0	4	23
Patrol boats	13 [b]	16	14
Air Force			
Personnel	3,000	3,500-4,000	7,000
Jet fighters	34	112	500
Reconnaissance	0	12	20
Helicopters	25	30	125
Transports	10	25	27

[a] Total includes personnel from Air Defense, which is a separate service in Sudan and Libya.
[b] Only one is operational.
[c] Total includes personnel from Air Defense Commands subordinate to Army Headquarters.
[d] Figures exclude some 200 tanks, about 135 field artillery pieces, nearly 200 armored vehicles, and some 40 air defense guns purchased by the Ethiopians from the Soviet Union but assigned to Cuban forces.

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Nimeiri to increase civilian participation in the political process, the military remains his main power base, and it is well represented at all levels of the country's only party, the Sudanese Socialist Union.

Military leaders have predominated for 19 out of the 26 years since independence in 1956—Ibrahim Abboud in 1958-64 and Gaafar Nimeiri since 1969. They have not proved any more successful than civilians, however, at solving the country's overwhelming economic, political, and social problems. most Sudanese military officers still appear to believe the military provides the most viable source of leadership.

Despite its traditional dominance, the unity of the military is weakened by the country's ethnic, tribal, sectarian, and geographic divisions. There are 56 separate ethnic groups that are subdivided into 597 smaller affiliations. Although Arabic has been the official language since 1956, 115 different languages are spoken. English—reflecting the colonial British experience—is still predominant as the lingua franca in the south. 73 percent of the total population is Muslim and about 4 percent Christian. The remainder is animist. Most Christians live in the south, although the southern population is largely animist.

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The "southern problem" remains another major threat to the military's unity and to the cohesion of the country as a whole.[5] Southerners comprise less than 20 percent of military personnel but have constituted about half of the soldiers in the Southern Command (1st Division) since the end of the civil war in 1972. They represent a potential security problem for the military, particularly if their grievances increase and they support or join Sudanese dissident groups such as the New Anya Nya (NAN).

Sudanese dissidents, including the NAN, mounted a series of attacks on Sudanese towns, army garrisons, and police stations from Ethiopian territory in mid-1982.

Since 1972 southerners in the military have suffered from two major types of discrimination: enforced Arabization and the preference accorded northerners in promotions and assignments. The decision in 1980 to require that the senior staff officers' course—a requirement for promotion to colonel—be taught in Arabic has virtually excluded English-speaking southern officers from higher rank. According to US Embassy Khartoum reporting, southerners complain, with justification, that northerners are promoted over them and that they rarely receive foreign military school and professional assignments.

During 1981 mutinies, desertions, and unrest among southern military personnel were more widespread than at any time since the end of the civil war. In an effort to limit organized opposition, the US defense attache in Khartoum notes that military leaders have begun efforts to improve morale by ensuring that the troops are paid properly and that visits by high-ranking officers to remote encampments are more frequent.

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military leaders have little confidence in the 1st Division's ability to deal with insurgent activity and have sent northern units into the south to conduct antidissident operations.

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the presence of northern troops exacerbates north-south tensions, which could escalate significantly if northern troops inadvertently killed innocent southern civilians while carrying out operations.

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Morale and Loyalty

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Senior officers—brigadier to lieutenant general—are considered the most loyal to President Nimeiri. Despite Nimeiri's falling out with the senior command in early 1982 and the dismissal of several high-ranking officers, little opposition is evident among remaining senior officers.

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Most senior officers appear moderately pro-Western and pro-Egyptian.

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most Sudanese, including officers, are wary of becoming too closely tied to Egypt. Having once been under Egyptian domination, the Sudanese are sensitive about current links to Cairo and perceive that Egyptians are condescending in their relationships with the Sudanese.

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Nearly all senior officers have had overseas assignments—many in the West—either as students, military attaches, or seconded officers. On average only a few years younger than Nimeiri himself, the senior officer corps has shared with the President the experiences of the civil war in the south (1955-72), the Nimeiri coup of 1969, the Soviet Bloc presence (1969-72), and coup attempts by Communists and Ansars in 1971 and 1976, respectively. Most senior officers

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belong to the Sudanese Socialist Union, and those with the rank of major general (about 20) automatically became members of the SSU Central Committee prior to its dissolution in early 1982.

Middle-grade officers (major to colonel) present a more mixed picture. Like senior officers, older colonels are considered basically loyal to the Nimeiri regime, and their morale appears to range from fair to good. Most middle-grade officers tend to be rank conscious since they serve as a buffer between senior and junior officers. According to the former US defense attache in Khartoum, they generally regard themselves as professionals and apparently shun politics. Many belong to the SSU mainly for appearances, and few apparently participate in party functions.

Most senior middle-grade officers shared the experiences of the postcolonial period along with senior officers, and many have also served abroad or are actively seeking such an assignment. Attitudes toward the West appear to range from strongly positive to neutral. Most older middle-grade officers appear distrustful of the Soviet Bloc, in part because of the attempted Communist coup in 1971. Many, especially the younger middle-grade officers, however, may favor a nonaligned foreign policy.

The most discontented of the middle-grade officers are a group known as the young majors. They all graduated from the military academy between 1969 and 1972 when classes were two to three times their normal size. During this period the Sudanese were heavily dependent on the Soviets for training and equipment, and many of the young majors received technical training in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Their inflated numbers give them fewer chances for promotion. Many, moreover, are severely frustrated because the military needs their technical skills and refuses to release them to find more lucrative positions in the civilian sector or abroad.

Junior officers are the least understood by the Sudanese military leadership or Western observers. Very few experienced the civil war, the Soviet Bloc presence, or the Communist coup attempt of 1971. Their attitudes toward the West remain unclear. US military observers believe that junior officers—like the young majors—are the most vulnerable to recruitment by opposition groups. 25X1 25X1

Junior officers appear to be the most impatient with low pay, infrequent promotions, poor equipment, parts shortages, and inflation. DIA they openly discuss the country's problems, and many disagree with the regime's approach to inflation and corruption. Most junior officers who sympathize with the young majors see little immediate hope for advancement and find they must postpone marriage because of financial constraints. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 DIA

As of mid-November younger officers at the Staff College are now openly criticizing the government. Not only are they critical of economic policy, but they strongly disapprove of Nimeiri's promise to send Sudanese troops to support Iraq's war with Iran. The attache's sources, however, report that the Staff College students have not yet called for Nimeiri's removal. DIA 25X1 25X1

Approximately 200 Sudanese officers have been trained in the United States since 1977, and this number will probably grow significantly in future years. Although this exposure presumably creates good will for the United States and improves Sudanese military capabilities, it may also encourage impatience with Sudan's present economic and political problems. 25X1 25X1

DIA there are serious morale problems among noncommissioned officers and the technical ranks. This group, however, is generally considered apolitical by US military observers. Their grievances are essentially economic. Despite salaries that compare favorably to other government employees, most skilled technicians and noncommissioned officers could make five times their salaries 25X1 25X1 25X1

working abroad. Consequently, there is a low rate of reenlistment, and many technicians harbor bitter resentment because they are forced to serve beyond their nine-year contract

Nimeiri's Leadership Style and the Military

Nimeiri clearly recognizes the importance of maintaining the support of the military. He personally selects officers and men for key units in the Khartoum area. Sudanese military intelligence closely monitors the civilian population and military personnel for indications of serious unhappiness. Malcontents and possible coup plotters are weeded out, and an effort is made to deal with morale problems.

For the most part Nimeiri has not dealt violently with his opponents. Rarely has he executed even coup plotters in the military—with the exception of officers who supported the Communist-led coup in 1971. Senior military officers who challenge Nimeiri or his policies are retired but usually are given a sizable pension or an ambassadorial post far from Sudan. In early 1982 Nimeiri retired some 20 senior officers considered loyal to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, who were dismissed for challenging Nimeiri's leadership and judgment. Carried out in typical Nimeiri style, the turnover of officers has so far been remarkably free of negative political repercussions. Nimeiri was able to maintain the support of most other senior officers at least in part because the retirements opened the way for promotions.

Following the events of early 1982, Nimeiri temporarily assumed the duties of Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff. He initially appointed three Deputy Chiefs of Staff thereby creating a fierce competition for Chief of Staff that would discourage a united political threat. This arrangement, however, has proved disruptive to the efficient management of the armed forces.

Nimeiri has generally attempted to pamper the military to ensure its continued loyalty. Last year a $5 million officers' club was erected in Khartoum. Even though inflation quickly erodes salary increases, Nimeiri has authorized substantial pay hikes over the past two years. To help offset inflation, officers receive special commissary privileges, free transportation to and from work, and a special housing allowance is paid to those living off post in the Khartoum area. Those in technical units with special skills reportedly are given bonuses. Nimeiri also sends many military personnel abroad for seconded assignments or training where they can receive five times their normal salary. After retirement, moreover, both officers and enlisted men receive placement assistance and have access to low-interest loans. Free medical treatment is also available to active-duty and retired officers and their extended families. 25X1

Opposition Efforts To Suborn the Military

There are a number of civilian opposition groups attempting to win supporters within the military, including the Ansar Muslim sect, the Muslim Brotherhood, the National Unionist Party, the Communist Party, and the Ba'th Party. The Ansars, who represent 20 percent of Sudan's 20 million people, comprise a significant number in the military. A small group of Ansar officers was implicated in a coup attempt in 1976, but there has been no indication that military personnel with Ansar loyalties have conspired on a broad basis. 25X1

support for the regime demonstrated by Ansar military personnel during the Ansar rebellion in 1970 continues. Sadiq al-Mahdi, their principal leader, could become a rallying point for Ansar discontent, but we do not believe he has a large following in the military. There are also exiled Ansars in Ethiopia, 25X1

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The Muslim Brotherhood is a significant political force in Sudan, but it currently supports the Nimeiri regime, and its leader, Hasan al-Turabi, serves as Attorney General. 25X1

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One of the most active opposition groups is the National Unionist Party (NUP). Presently the NUP is split between the Khatmiyyah sect, which favors ties with Egypt, and a more leftist faction dedicated to Nimeiri's downfall and the elimination of Egyptian influence. In 1981 the now deceased leader of the leftist faction reportedly sponsored an anti-Nimeiri organization known as the National Organization of Sudanese Officers and Soldiers, but Sudanese security has no evidence that it was active in Sudan.

Although the Sudanese Communist Party had an estimated 5,000 members in mid-1979, very few probably were active-duty military personnel. Since the abortive Communist coup in 1971, military security has weeded out most Communist sympathizers, and

Over the past two years there has been some indication of renewed activity by a new Free Army Officers Organization (FAOO) within the Sudanese Army. The old FAOO provided the vehicle for President Nimeiri to seize power in Sudan in May 1969. In 1980 FAOO leaflets were distributed to the press, Army officers clubs, and certain opposition parties. The leaflet claimed that the FAOO was still in operation and would intervene in local economic and political developments if necessary. Late in the summer of 1981, there was another distribution of FAOO pamphlets, this time protesting corruption and incompetence among senior officials. No signs of FAOO activities have appeared in 1982. Some Sudanese military officials believe that the appearance of FAOO leaflets in 1980-81 was the work of the NUP and the Communists.

Prospects for Military Loyalty

Nimeiri presently appears to retain the support of most of Sudan's military. Some US observers suggest that this support is based less on enthusiasm for Nimeiri than it is on the lack of a political alternative. We believe that the military overthrow of the Nimeiri regime remains a possibility, especially if the economy plunges into an even more serious decline that generates massive civil unrest. 25X1 25X1 25X1

In 1964 the Sudanese military allowed the collapse of the Abboud military government by taking no action to control civilian riots. If extensive civilian riots should again develop over economic grievances, the military might behave similarly. If ordered to quell unrest, senior officers might fear losing control of junior officers and lower ranks sympathetic to the rioters. In such a situation, senior officers might decide to enlist the support of civilian opposition groups for a national coalition government dominated by the armed forces. 25X1 25X1

Retired senior Sudanese military officers have expressed concern 25X1 over the possibility of conspiracies against DIA Nimeiri among junior officers and young majors triggered by economic grievances and resentment ove 25X1 corruption. We believe that a coup attempt by the DIA junior officers probably would not be successful. It is more likely that senior officers, recognizing a threat from the lower ranks, would stage a preemptive coup. If senior officers failed to take action, middle-grade officers who have direct command over large military units might seize power rather than risk weakening military unity. 25X1

Implications for the United States

Any military government that replaced the present regime would, in our view, be less likely to continue the close working relationship with the United States that has developed under Nimeiri. Even a government 25X1

run by senior or older middle-grade officers, generally well disposed toward Egypt and the United States, would attempt at least initially to project the appearance of independence from foreign influence in order to strengthen its hand among those Sudanese critical of the country's current foreign policy orientation. As a result, Sudan's support for US positions on regional issues—including the peace process with Israel—might wane, and Nimeiri's offer of military facilities to the United States might be withdrawn, if only temporarily. Outward displays of cooperation with Egypt, moreover, would probably cease temporarily, including activities mandated by the integration charter signed in 1982. 25X1

Nonetheless, we do not believe that a complete turnaround in US-Sudanese relations would occur. A new government probably would look to the United States for continued economic and military aid. Additionally, a new government could not easily replace the security guarantees against Libyan and Ethiopian threats that Egypt provides through the mutual defense pact of 1976. 25X1

In the unlikely event that more junior officers seized and held power, the future of Sudanese relations with the United States and Egypt would probably be much less favorable, but not enough is known about the views of these officers to speculate with confidence. 25X1

Appendix A

Military Officers in Sudanese Cabinet Posts

Since Gaafar Nimeiri took power in May 1969, military officers have dominated the more important ministerial posts but have comprised a relatively small segment of the total cabinet. Since 1969 about 16 percent of cabinet appointees have been from the military.[6] Shortly after Nimeiri came to power, that percentage rose to about 30 percent, but it now is less than 10 percent because of the dismissals that followed the confrontation between Nimeiri and the former military command at the beginning of 1982.

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In addition to the presidency, military officers have normally held the post of vice president and the ministers of defense, interior, and state security. Two-thirds of these positions were filled by Army officers with either an armor or infantry background, a reflection of the strength of these branches. Conversely, no prime minister, foreign minister, attorney general, or minister of justice, except for Nimeiri himself, has ever come from the military.

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Nimeiri, a Colonel with a background in armor at the time of the coup in 1969, has usually held two and as many as four cabinet positions at one time. Since 1969 Nimeiri has held the post of Minister of Defense four times. This tactic has helped to prevent one man from establishing a significant power base within the armed forces.

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Southern military officers have had a negligible role in the cabinet. Joseph Lagu, appointed second vice president in June 1982, is the only one to hold a cabinet position. The power of the second vice president is illusory, however, since no responsibilities are attached to this office and he is not in line to succeed the president.

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[6] Excluding Nimeiri.

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Appendix B

Biographies

Marshal Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri

Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, aided by a small circle of "Free Officers," seized power in a coup in May 1969 and named himself Prime Minister. He became President in September 1971 and, except for 13 months during 1976-77, has continued to serve as Prime Minister. Currently he holds the Defense portfolio and is de facto Chief of Staff.

After taking over the government, Nimeiri successfully overcame opposition from conservative Muslim groups and then from Communists and their sympathizers. In February 1972 he settled the 17-year-long insurrection in the south, granted amnesty to the rebels, gave the area partial autonomy, and integrated southerners into the government. In February 1981 he granted partial autonomy to other regions as well.

Nimeiri has the reputation of being hard driving. He approaches problems methodically, without much imagination or depth. A career Army officer until the 1969 coup, Nimeiri attended the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during 1965-66. Before coming to power he was arrested several times for coup plotting. Once antagonistic, Nimeiri has become increasingly friendly toward the United States since the mid-1970s.

Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib

Maj. Gen. (retired) Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib has served as Minister of State Security since 1978 and as First Vice President since April 1982. Close to the President, he is responsible for both internal and external intelligence and has often acted as Nimeiri's envoy on foreign missions. Tayyib clearly harbors aspirations to become president. 25X1 25X1

As First Vice President, Tayyib is first in line to succeed Nimeiri. He is unpopular with senior military officers and leftist groups, however, and US Embassy officials in Khartoum have questioned his competence. Nevertheless, Tayyib remains the most likely successor to Nimeiri if the office is transferred through constitutional means. Tayyib is favorably disposed toward the United States, although he has criticized Washington's stance toward Sudan's economic problems. 25X1 25X1

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Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Hasan Suwar Dahab

Promoted to General and named Deputy Minister of Defense in October, Abd al-Rahman Suwar Dahab has also been Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics since May 1982. Among those senior officers forcibly retired in 1971 on charges of aiding a Communist-led coup attempt, he has held several responsible positions since his reinstatement in the armed forces in 1972. Suwar Dahab is regarded as intelligent and hard working by his fellow officers, although critics have charged that he is unable to make decisions, even routine ones. He apparently is not ambitious and has not been politically active in recent years. He is considered pro-British and friendly toward the United States.

Tawfiq Salih Hasan Abu Kadok

Lt. Gen. Tawfiq Abu Kadok has been Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations since May 1982. He is senior in prestige but ranks below the other two deputies. A strong supporter of Nimeiri, Abu Kadok defended the President in his confrontation with senior officers in January 1982. He is closely associated with the influential Minister of Presidential Affairs Baha al-Din Idris. Abu Kadok is deeply suspicious of Ethiopia and leads the faction within the military favoring a more militant response to Ethiopian-based subversion against Sudan. Strongly pro-Egyptian, he at one time served in the Egyptian Army and has an Egyptian wife. He is believed to be friendly toward the United States.

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Yusif Ahmad Sulayman Yusif

Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration since May 1982, Lieutenant General Yusif also served as a member of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union until Nimeiri dissolved that body in January 1982. Like his fellow deputy, Lt. Gen. Abu Kadok, he supported Nimeiri during the confrontation with senior officers in January. An outstanding coordinator, Yusif is highly regarded by military observers. Allegedly a Communist sympathizer during the 1960s, Yusif changed his views after the Communist-inspired coup attempt in 1971. He is now believed to be staunchly anti-Communist and generally favorable toward the United States.

Al-Sir Muhammad Ahmad

Director of Military Intelligence since February 1982, Maj. Gen. al-Sir Muhammad Ahmad is a career intelligence officer. Al-Sir is close to Nimeiri, who frequently consults him on internal security matters. Since his appointment as Director, al-Sir's organization has encroached on some of the responsibilities held by Umar al-Tayyib's State Security Organization. A critic of Lt. Gen. Abu Kadok, he believes Lieutenant General Yusif should be the lone Chief of Staff.

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He appears generally favorable toward the United States.

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Abd al-Azim Siddiq Muhammad

As commander of the Armored Corps in Khartoum, Maj. Gen. Abd al-Azim Siddiq Muhammad is a key figure in maintaining the regime of President Nimeiri and protecting the capital of Sudan. He attained the rank of major general early in his career and has led the Armored Corps since April 1982.

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Abd al-Fattah Aziz Hawari

A lifelong friend of President Nimeiri, Col. Abd al-Fattah Aziz Hawari has been commander of the 500-man Presidential Protective Troop, commonly known as the Presidential Guard, since January 1982. Hawari is responsible for the physical security of the President and selected foreign visitors.

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DIA

Mutasim al-Sarraj Ahmad

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Brig. Gen. Mutasim al-Sarraj Ahmad since January has been commander of the Airborne Brigade that is instrumental in protecting the regime of President Nimeiri. He was promoted to brigadier in late 1980.

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